




















It Does Not Follow. Response to “Yes They Can! . . . ”
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This a response to “Yes They Can!. . . ” (a comment on [5]) by J.S. Shaari et al. [9]. We show that
the claims in the comment do not hold up and that all the conclusions obtained in [5] are correct.
In particular, the two considered kinds of two-way communication protocols (ping-pong and LM05)
under a quantum-man-in-the-middle (QMM) attack have neither a critical disturbance (D), nor a
valid privacy amplification (PA) procedure, nor an unconditional security proof. However, we point
out that there is another two-way protocol which does have a critical D and a valid PA and which
is resistant to a QMM attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ref. [5] we considered quantum-man-in-the-middle
(QMM) attacks on two kinds of two-way quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocols: ping-pong one with en-
tangled photons [2] and LM05 one with single photons
[4]. In the attacks, an undetectable eavesdropper (Eve)
copies all messages in the message mode (MM) so as to
keep sender’s (Bob) qubit in the quantum memory, sends
her own qubits to the encoder (Alice), receives and de-
codes Alice’s messages, encodes it on kept Bob’s qubits,
and sends them back to Bob. We showed that
(i) attacks leave no errors in the MM and hence the
standard methods of establishing security from the
literature [8] are not available;
(ii) standard privacy amplification (PA) procedure from
the literature [8] cannot be executed due to the ab-
sence of a critical value of the disturbance (D) in
the MM;
(iii) the security proof for LM05 put forward in [3] does
not cover the aforementioned QMM attack and
therefore it cannot be considered to be a proof of
unconditional security of LM05.
The authors of [9] claim that the above conclusions
obtained in [5] are erroneous, though. In this paper we
show that their claims do not hold up.
II. METHODS
We re-analyze the QMM attacks on two different two-
way QKD protocols: entangled photon (ping-pong) and
single photon (LM05) ones with reference to [5] and [9],
in order to show that the conclusions obtained in [5] are
correct and that the claims against them, put forward in
[9], fail.
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The authors of [9] reformulated the above points (i-iii)
and we denote those reformulations as (i)′, (ii)′, and (iii)′,
respectively, below. The points (i)′-(iii)′ do not faithfully
correspond to (i)-(iii).
In what follows, we show that none of the claims of
the authors of [9] against (i-iii) holds up. We analyze
their points (i-iii)′ one by one and show that (i-iii) are all
correct.
(i)′ attacks which leave no errors in the MM do not al-
low for security to be established by standard meth-
ods;
The security of a protocol, under individual, or col-
lective, or general (coherent) attacks, alike, is standardly
evaluated via the critical quantum bit error rate (QBER)
by calculating the secret fraction r = IAB − IE , where
IE = min(IAE , IBE), where IAB, IAE , and IBE , are mu-
tual information in the MM between Alice and Bob, Alice
and Eve, and Bob and Eve, respectively [8]. The mutual
information serves Alice and Bob to establish the quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) key in the MM and Eve to
snatch it from the MM.
Now, surprisingly, the authors of [9] claim: “In two-
way QKD IE is obtained from the CM whereas IAB is
estimated from the MM. Therefore, the CM makes it
possible to properly execute the [privacy amplification]
PA whereas the MM enables a proper execution of the
[error correction] EC.”
In the control mode (CM) Alice and Bob can only es-
timate to which extent Eve was in the line and Eve can
find out by which signals they did so (50%), but that
cannot offer them any information on the key itself (via
PA). On the other hand, there is no EC, since IAB = 1.
Contradicting themselves, in the next paragraph the
authors of [9] admit that IAB = 1, that “there is no error
in the MM,” and that the error rate in the CM is 50%,
but claim that all that “is inconsequential” and write
“Hence, if Eve attacks a fraction f of the qubits, the
resulting secret key rate will be given by r = 1 − f ≥ 0,
2with equality when f = 1, i.e., when Eve attacks all the
qubits. Therefore, the protocol is always secure against
such an attack, for any value of f .”
However, when Eve attacks all the qubits, she knows
all the messages with certainty, i.e., the whole key. When
f < 1, Alice and Bob do not have an available procedure
to erase the parts of the key Eve snatched, as shown
below. Such a protocol cannot be considered secure.
So, [9]’s claims against (i) do not hold up. Note that
(i)′ distorts the meaning of (i) which claims that “stan-
dard methods,” i.e., those from the literature, are not
available, not that the security cannot be achieved at all
as stated in (i)′. Let us look at the next point.
(ii)′ privacy amplification (PA) cannot be executed due
to the absence of a “critical value” similar to
BB84’s famous 11%;
“PA [is a procedure] aimed at destroying Eve’s knowl-
edge of the reference raw key. . . The fraction to be re-
moved. . . is IE” [8]. The procedure was established in
[1] and refined in [7]. Eve’s knowledge comes exclusively
from MM by the very definition of the mutual informa-
tion and when IE exceeds IAB at the critical value of
the D (11% for BB84), Alice and Bob have to abort the
transmission.
In contrast to that, the authors write: “The absence
of errors in MM simply ensures the unity value for IAB,
to the legitimate parties’ benefit, and has no bearing in
determining the PA rate, which is a function of IE es-
timated from the error rate in CM. Obviously, differing
values for errors in CM would translate into differing PA
rates, hence differing r, effectively dismissing the notion
of ‘critical value’.”
This just does not make any operational sense. All
messages Eve snatched are perfectly correct and there
is nothing to be erased in the PA procedure. On the
other hand, due to exponential attenuation of signals in
fibers, Alice and Bob can hardly guess which messages
Eve snatched even when the CM and MM signals are
equally numerous and when f is low. When f is high or
close or equal to 1, this is absolutely impossible because
then they erase the whole key. There is simply no reliable
method of identifying Eve’s messages, especially not with
the present PA procedure. So, the considered protocols
under the QMM attack is equivalent to sending a plain
text under an unspecified “protection” of the CM.
It helps to dig into the literature. For instance, “some
considered . . . quantum secure direct communication
[two-way protocols] and generated some interest. How-
ever, it was soon recognized that the idea suffers from a
major default with respect to standard QKD. It allows no
analogue of privacy amplification: if an eavesdropper ob-
tains information, it is information on the message itself
and of course cannot be erased.” [8]
The authors of [9] further claim that “a similar ar-
gument applies even in the BB84 protocol, where the
amount of PA executed depends on the actual error rate
that has been detected, not on a predetermined critical
value like the 11% quoted in [5].”
As stressed above and shown in Fig. 5(a) of [5],
D = 0.11 is not “predetermined;” it corresponds to
IAB = IAE . For D > 0.11 we have IAB < IAE , i.e., Eve
has more information than Alice and Bob who therefore
cannot possibly carry out PA beyond D = 0.11 at which
point they are left with no bits for the key.
Hence, [9]’s claims against (ii) fail, too. Note that (ii)′
distorts the meaning of (ii) which claims that “standard
privacy amplification,” i.e., the one from the literature,
cannot be executed, not that the privacy amplification
cannot be executed at all as stated in (ii)′. As for the
last point
(iii)′ the existing security proofs [3] are flawed as they
do not consider this specific class of attacks,
first of all, nowhere in [5] did we write that the proofs
from [3] are “flawed.” We just pointed out that they do
not cover the QMM attack, i.e., that they are not general
enough to provide an unconditional security proof for the
LM05 protocol.
In [9] we read: “This is clearly untrue as QMM attack
can be described as a specific case of such proofs. It suf-
fices to consider Eve’s ancilla as a qubit and the unitary
transformation as the well known SWAP gate.”
But, when we look into [3] this does not make sense.
Eq. (1), III.B. Eve’s attack in Bob-Alice channel of [3]
reads: UBE |0〉B|E〉 = c00|0〉B|E00〉 + c01|1〉B|E01〉, etc.,
where |0〉B, |1〉B are Bob’s qubits and |E〉, |E00〉, |E01〉
Eve’s ancillas. How can we now consider U as a SWAP
gate for her ancillas and what does it swap for what?
Our Eve does not make use of ancillas at all and does
not resend Bob’s qubits. So, the security analysis is for
another type of attack, not for the QMM one.
The authors even admit that “an attack in the back-
ward path is not made explicit as an extremely pes-
simistic stand is taken where Eve is allowed to extract
all possible information from the entire Bob-Eve system
without specifying the actual mechanism.”
What does an “extremely pessimistic stand” mean in
the context of a rigorous proof? Equally so, within a
rigorous proof of a theorem, Eve cannot be “allowed” to
“extract all possible information from the entire Bob-Eve
system without specifying the actual mechanism.” And
most importantly, an analysis of a QMM attack can-
not be carried out without the “the backward path” be-
ing considered. If one does not analyse the backward
path then one cannot detect Eve at all because in the
QMM Eve just lets all the messages in both CM and
MM through to Alice.
This shows that the proof in [3] does not cover a QMM
attack and, hence, that it is not an unconditional security
proof . Ergo, claims against (iii) from [9] fail, as well.
3IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the claims put forward by the
authors of [9] that the conclusions obtained in [5] and
cited in Sec. I as (i), (ii), and (iii), are erroneous.
In Sec. III we show that none of the claims from [9]
holds up and that the conclusions (i), (ii), and (iii) about
the QMM attacks on the two-way communication proto-
cols from [5] are correct.
The most important point of [5] is the following. It is
obvious that when Eve is in the line all the time (caring
out a QMM attack) she has all the messages (without in-
ducing any error in the MM) and therefore the PA cannot
be done. When Eve is in the line only up to a certain
percentage of the transmission time, then PA might be
possible based on the disturbance (D) from the CM but
we do not know up to which value of D (usually called
critical D) the PA would be valid under a QMM attack.
So, we need an elaborated procedure and algorithmwhich
would ensure that Eve would possess no significant num-
ber of messages after the PA procedure. A good example
of how to estimate when and how we should design a PA
procedure is given in [10].
Having said that, we would like to stress that the two-
way direct communication protocols covered in [5] in-
clude just two best-known ones of their kind: the ping-
pong and LM05 protocols (see Sec. I). These two kinds
of two-way protocols have neither a critical D, nor a
valid PA for a QMM attack since no one has come for-
ward with them in the literature as of yet. The security
proof from [3] does not contain or elaborate on them and
therefore cannot be considered “unconditional” until one
closes this open question.
Still, a two way communication protocol with a critical
D, valid PA, and resistant to a QMM attack, is possible,
as shown in [6]. So, “quite complex two-way QKD se-
curity proofs” which the authors of [9] refer to in their
Conclusions might indeed help us all to develop security
analysis of an implementable high capacity (four bits)
two-way protocol.
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